SAMIR, the story of Morocco's only oil refinery

For more than half a century, almost all the fuel used in Morocco passed through a single plant: the SAMIR refinery in Mohammedia. Its distillation towers have been idle since August 2015. The company still exists in law, but it has been in judicial liquidation since 2016, and its shares have been frozen on the stock exchange for more than eleven years. Its story runs alongside that of independent Morocco: industrialisation in the 1960s, privatisation in the 1990s, then the country’s largest bankruptcy.

A refinery for energy independence (1959-1995)

In 1959, three years after independence, the Moroccan state signed an agreement with Italy’s state-owned ENI group to build a refinery near the port of Mohammedia. King Mohammed V laid the foundation stone on 25 June 1960. Construction was completed in 1961. The first distillation unit then processed 1.25 million tonnes of crude oil a year.

In the 1970s the capital was transferred to Moroccan ownership and the company took the name Société Anonyme Marocaine de l’Industrie du Raffinage, abbreviated as SAMIR. Successive expansions raised capacity to 10 million tonnes a year. The plant was backed by some 280 storage tanks holding about 2 million cubic metres in total, equivalent to 60 days of national consumption.

The stock market, then privatisation (1996-1997)

SAMIR was part of the privatisation programme launched in the early 1990s. The first step was a listing on the Casablanca Stock Exchange on 19 March 1996. Shares were offered at MAD 243, for a nominal value of MAD 50. Nearly 60,000 subscribers, mostly individuals, took part.

The second step came in 1997, when the controlling stake was sold to the Swedish-Saudi group Corral Petroleum, owned by businessman Mohammed Hussein Al Amoudi. According to the Competition Council, as cited by TelQuel, the deal covered both SAMIR and the country’s other refiner, Société Chérifienne des Pétroles (SCP), for about MAD 4 billion. It was then the largest transaction in the history of Moroccan privatisation. SCP was merged into SAMIR in 1999.

The deal came with commitments on both sides. The buyer promised investments within the first five years, including about MAD 1 billion to modernise the Sidi Kacem refinery and MAD 5 to 6 billion for a hydrocracking unit in Mohammedia. The state, for its part, kept customs protection on refined products for several years. According to economist Najib Akesbi, only MAD 2.2 billion of the 1998-2002 investment plan, worth more than MAD 4 billion, had been carried out by its deadline.

On the eve of its liquidation, the shareholding was as follows: 67.27% for Corral, 5.78% for the Holmarcom group and 26.95% for the public, divided into 11.89 million shares.

The 2002 fire

On the night of 25 November 2002, torrential rain hit Mohammedia. The refinery was flooded, with water up to two metres deep in places. Oil slicks floating on the water came into contact with installations that were still hot. Two fires broke out that evening, first in production units and then in the plant supplying electricity and steam. Two operators were killed. Le Matin put the damage at about MAD 1.5 billion at the time, an estimate the newspaper called “very rough”. A full restoration was expected to take 8 to 12 months.

Modernisation and debt (2004-2014)

In 2004 a new MAD 6 billion investment agreement was signed with the state. It covered, in particular, the new hydrocracking unit. The project overran: in 2008, the prospectus for a bond issue stated that the modernisation budget, estimated at MAD 7.14 billion, had been exceeded by about MAD 2 billion. SAMIR then raised MAD 800 million in bonds on the Moroccan market and borrowed MAD 1.2 billion from banks.

Cash flow problems set in. According to Médias24, the company covered the overrun from its working capital, then turned to short-term loans, factoring and leasing. It nevertheless kept paying dividends: MAD 20 per share in 2008, then MAD 8 in 2014 for the 2013 financial year. At the end of 2014 it announced a record loss of MAD 3.4 billion. In the first half of 2015 the loss still reached MAD 2.17 billion.

Refining stops (August 2015)

On 5 August 2015, unable to pay its suppliers, SAMIR announced a halt to its operations: crude cargoes had stopped arriving. The next day, 6 August, trading in its shares was suspended on the Casablanca Stock Exchange. It never resumed.

Creditors rushed in. The customs administration claimed more than MAD 13 billion, of which MAD 12.6 billion was principal. This was domestic consumption tax and VAT collected by SAMIR from its customers but not paid over to the state, under a payment facility granted to large operators. Customs froze the accounts, then moved on to seizures. At the end of August 2015, Médias24 estimated total debt at MAD 42 to 43 billion, including MAD 8 to 10 billion owed to Moroccan banks.

The context also changed for the whole sector: at the end of 2015, fuel prices were liberalised. Morocco now imports all of its refined products.

Judicial liquidation (2016)

In November 2015, SAMIR itself requested an amicable settlement. An expert report ordered by the court president concluded that the company had stopped payments, which ruled out that procedure. On 21 March 2016, the Casablanca commercial court ordered judicial liquidation, finding the situation “irremediably compromised”. It authorised operations to continue for three months, an authorisation that was later renewed many times. Mohamed El Krimi was appointed liquidator.

Before the commercial court of appeal, the main shareholder pledged to inject USD 670 million if liquidation were replaced by receivership. The court found the pledge vague, with no deadline and no bank evidence, and upheld the liquidation on 1 June 2016.

Executives held to account (2018-2020)

On 5 November 2018, the Casablanca commercial court extended the liquidation to the personal assets of several executives, including chairman Mohammed Hussein Al Amoudi and chief executive Jamal Ba-Amer. It also barred them from commercial activity for five years. Other directors were cleared.

According to TelQuel, the liquidator’s report listed several management failings:

• failure to honour the 2004 investment agreement;
• payment of MAD 94 million in dividends in 2013, while the company was heavily indebted;
• a USD 200 million short-term loan taken from Standard Chartered;
• the sale in 2006 of a hotel subsidiary to a company linked to the shareholder, for MAD 66 million that was never paid.

The commercial court of appeal upheld this extension in January 2020.

Ten years of takeover attempts

On 30 January 2017, the court ordered the sale of the refinery, without setting a starting price. A court-appointed expert later valued the assets at more than MAD 21 billion. Bidders came and went, but none succeeded. Most failed to provide the bank guarantee required by the supervising judge. In 2019, Petroen of the United Arab Emirates offered USD 2.5 billion but did not close the deal.

Time is working against the plant. In 2021, Médias24 reported that bringing it back up to standard would cost about MAD 2 billion, compared with MAD 200 million when it stopped, and that the value of the assets had fallen by 20% since the last valuation.

In February 2026, MJM Investments Limited, a UAE investor backed by Barclays, submitted an offer of about USD 3.5 billion, or about MAD 34 billion. On 27 February the court did not accept it: the offer was conditional on access to the site and a full technical assessment, which did not meet the requirements of a court-ordered sale. Médias24 specified that it was declared inadmissible pending a complete file. According to its reconstruction, admitted liabilities exceed MAD 30 billion, more than half of which is owed to public creditors.

The storage tanks, an unused asset

In spring 2020, the pandemic-driven collapse in oil prices offered a chance to rebuild the country’s security stocks, well below the legal minimum of 60 days. On 14 May 2020, the supervising judge authorised the state to lease SAMIR’s tanks. Operation was entrusted to the National Office of Hydrocarbons and Mines (ONHYM). The plan never materialised: according to Le360, it depended on a governance framework, authorisations and funding, and the ongoing international arbitration encouraged caution.

The issue resurfaced in March 2026, when the oil price spike linked to the war in the Middle East was a reminder that Morocco had only about 30 days of reserves.

The international arbitration

On 14 March 2018, Corral Morocco Holdings, SAMIR’s Swedish shareholder, filed a claim with the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), part of the World Bank. It invoked the Sweden-Morocco investment treaty and claimed USD 2.7 billion.

On 15 July 2024, the arbitral tribunal rejected most of the claim and ordered Morocco to pay USD 150 million, less than 6% of the amount sought. The government stated that, in its view, the company’s failure stemmed from the majority shareholder not meeting its commitments. Both parties requested corrections, decided on 6 November 2024. On 6 December 2024 Morocco filed an application for partial annulment of the award, and enforcement was stayed. The stay was extended on 30 June 2025. To our knowledge, no decision on the annulment has been made public to date.

The small shareholders

Minority shareholders, who hold 26.95% of the capital, have been unable to buy or sell their shares since 6 August 2015. The last quoted price is MAD 127.80. The share had reached MAD 1,100 in 2007, before the financial crisis. As long as the liquidation continues under an authorisation to operate, the Moroccan Capital Market Authority cannot request delisting: SAMIR therefore remains listed, but frozen.

The cost of the shutdown

A study published in 2025 in the journal Scientific African, cited by Billionaires.Africa, puts the cost of SAMIR’s collapse to the Moroccan economy at about MAD 66.5 billion. Beyond the figures, the shutdown ended nearly 1,000 direct jobs and the business of many subcontractors in Mohammedia. The issue regularly returns to Parliament, where several bills to nationalise the refinery have been tabled since 2021, without success.

Where things stand at the end of October 2026

• SAMIR has been in judicial liquidation for more than ten years, with no buyer.
• Refining has been halted since 5 August 2015. Morocco imports all of its fuel.
• Admitted liabilities exceed MAD 30 billion.
• The shares have been suspended since 6 August 2015.
• Morocco’s application for partial annulment of the ICSID award was still under review according to the latest public information.
• In May 2026, SAMIR launched a call for tenders for the complete rehabilitation of a storage tank on its site.

Key figures

Sources: Wikipédia, Samir (entreprise marocaine), October 29, 2026; Maroc Hebdo, Une patate chaude nommée la SAMIR, July 19, 2024; Médias24, La Samir : les petits porteurs bloqués en bourse depuis bientôt 4 ans, June 24, 2019; TelQuel, Privatisation de la SAMIR, le péché originel du chaos des carburants, February 19, 2019; N. Akesbi, Privatisation de la Samir et libéralisation, Revue marocaine de science politique, May 1, 2021; Le Matin, L'incendie a causé 1,5 milliard de dirhams de pertes pour la Samir, November 29, 2002; CDVM, SAMIR : note d'information, emprunt obligataire de 800 millions de dirhams, December 18, 2008; Médias24, Samir : les créanciers se précipitent, au moins 20 milliards de DH de saisies, August 14, 2015; Médias24, La Samir cumule 43 milliards de DH de dettes, August 24, 2015; Médias24, Affaire Samir : la douane passe à l'exécution, August 31, 2015; Médias24, SAMIR : le tribunal prononce la liquidation judiciaire, March 21, 2016; Médias24, Samir : la Cour d'appel confirme la liquidation, June 1, 2016; Financial Afrik, Reconduction de la suspension des titres de capital de Samir, June 22, 2016; Finances News, Samir : le tribunal de commerce de Casablanca ordonne la cession, February 1, 2017; TelQuel, Affaire Samir : Al Amoudi et Ba-Amer verront leurs biens saisis par la justice, November 5, 2018; Hespress FR, La Samir : liquidation des biens personnels confirmée, January 23, 2020; Médias24, Location des bacs de stockage de la Samir : comment l'État justifie sa démarche, May 14, 2020; Boursenews, L'exploitation des réservoirs de la Samir confiée à l'ONHYM, June 3, 2020; Médias24, La Samir : « la solution est à Rabat, pas à Casablanca », July 12, 2021; Italaw, Corral Morocco Holdings AB v. Kingdom of Morocco (CIRDI ARB/18/7), sentence, July 15, 2024; Barlamane Today, ICSID rejects Corral Morocco Holding's demand for 2.7 billion, July 15, 2024; Daily Jus, 2025 Arbitration Year in Review: Morocco, June 1, 2026; Le360, Le tribunal de commerce de Casablanca rejette l'offre de l'émirati MJM, February 27, 2026; Médias24, Affaire la Samir : qui sont les créanciers en attente ?, March 2, 2026; Médias24, La guerre au Moyen-Orient relance la fâcheuse question de la Samir, March 9, 2026; Le360, Le plan de l'ONHYM pour la réutilisation des réservoirs de la Samir tombe à l'eau, April 9, 2026; Médias24, Stockage d'hydrocarbures : Stroc Industrie lorgne un marché de la Samir, August 27, 2026; Billionaires.Africa, Samir collapse cost Morocco 66.5bn dirhams, study finds, September 22, 2026.

Published on October 29, 2026. A mistake or a detail to add? Write to us.